

DOUGHERTY JR BERNARD J
79 KABUL 4236

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PAGE 01 KABUL 04236 01 OF 02 021229Z

ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 AID-05 SY-05 MCT-02
TRSE-00 OMB-01 EB-08 HA-05 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 /087 W

-----012538 021250Z 41

O R 021150Z JUN 79

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4101

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PEPR, PINS, AF, US

SUBJ: SENATE AMENDMENT ON AID TO AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 131866

1. (LOU - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. WHILE THIS EMBASSY IS MOST SYMPATHETIC TOWARD THE SENTIMENTS WHICH PROMPTED THE PELL-STONE AMENDMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1979 (REFTEL), WE QUESTION WHETHER THAT AMENDMENT WOULD SERVE OVERALL U.S. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA. END SUMMARY.

3. WE SHARE THE CONGRESS'S AND THE DEPARTMENT'S DESIRE TO LEARN THE WHOLE TRUTH ABOUT THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE TRAGIC KIDNAPPING AND ASSASSINATION OF AMBASSADOR DUBS AND WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE DRA TO BE FORTHCOMING IN THAT REGARD. WE CONSIDER IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REGIME WILL

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PAGE 02 KABUL 04236 01 OF 02 021229Z

EVER APOLOGIZE OFFICIALLY FOR ITS HANDLING OF THE INCIDENT, LET ALONE ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S DEATH.

4. THE UTILITY OF THE AMENDMENT'S REQUIREMENT THAT THE DRA AGREE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR ALL USG PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN HINGES LARGELY ON WHAT IS MEANT BY "ADEQUATE." THE DRA DOES PROVIDE GUARDS FOR USG FACILITIES IN KABUL, FOR THE CHARGE, AND, AS REQUESTED, FOR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. IT ALSO PROVIDES A GUARD TO ACCOMPANY THE AMERICAN SCHOOL'S BUSES. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD INHIBIT THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR FUNCTIONS WERE WE TO REQUEST AND RECEIVE BODYGUARDS FOR ALL USG PERSONNEL. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO WAY OF GUARANTEEING THAT A DETERMINED, WELL-PLANNED TERRORIST ATTACK ON USG PERSONNEL WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL, NO MATTER HOW MANY DRA GUARDS MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO PROTECT SUCH PERSONNEL.

5. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY "SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN AFGHANISTAN" OF THE KIND ENVISAGED BY THE AMENDMENT'S SECTION B WILL PROBABLY DEPEND ON FACTORS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (A)EDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *MAC*

DATE *3/13/81*

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE

TS AUTH. REASON(S)

ENDORSE EXISTING ☐ 1979

DECLASSIFIED ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASE ☐ ☐

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

PAGE 1

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PAGE 1

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EXTRANEOUS TO THE DUBS TRAGEDY. WE WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT
A KEY FIGURE IN THAT INCIDENT, SAYED DAOUD TAROON, HAS BEEN
REMOVED FROM THE POLICE CHIEF POSITION HE HELD AT THAT TIME.
WE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER TAROON'S TRANSFER REPRESENTS A
DEMOTION OR PROMOTION OR WHETHER IT IS AT ALL RELATED TO HIS
HANDLING OF THE AMBASSADOR'S KIDNAPPING.

6. WE ARE VERY MINDFUL OF AMBASSADOR DUBS' OWN VIEWS ON
AFGHANISTAN. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE US HAS FEW INTERESTS
IN AFGHANISTAN, PER SE. ACCORDINGLY, HE FELT THAT THE USG
SHOULD LOOK ON AFGHANISTAN PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF REGIONAL
STABILITY. HE STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT AFGHANISTAN SHOULD
NOT BECOME A DESTABILIZING FACTOR AND THAT WE SHOULD COOPERATE

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PAGE 03 KABUL 04236 01 OF 02 021229Z

WITH OTHER NATIONS, INCLUDING THE FREE NATIONS OF THIS AREA.
IN SEEKING TO OFFER THE AFGHANS AN ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE TO
THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

7. DURING ITS 13 MONTHS OF RULE, THE DRA HAS MOVED INCREASINGLY
CLOSER TO MOSCOW AND HAS ACCUSED ITS OTHER THREE NEIGHBORS,
PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND CHINA, OF MEDDLING IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS
(NOTABLY THE GROWING ANTI-REGIME DISSIDENCE AND GUERRILLA
WARFARE). WE PRESENTLY SEE NO SIGNS THAT THE DRA WILL SHIFT
ITS POLICIES AWAY FROM THE RADICAL, PRO-SOVIET LINE THAT IT
NOW ESPOUSES, AND NO SIGNS THAT THE ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES
WILL ABATE.

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PAGE 01 KABUL 04236 02 OF 02 021231Z

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 4236

8. NONETHELESS, WE CONSIDER IT IN THE USG'S INTERESTS AND IN THE INTERESTS OF REGIONAL STABILITY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO HAVE THE OPTION OF CONTINUING AID DISBURSEMENTS FOR AT LEAST THE PIPELINE. EVEN THOUGH THE PRESENT AFGHAN REGIME'S LEADERSHIP OFTEN BEHAVES IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO US DESIRES AND INTERESTS, WE KNOW THAT THERE ARE AFGHANS OUTSIDE THE REGIME AND SOME PERHAPS WITHIN IT WHO VALUE A CONTINUED, THOUGH LIMITED, U.S. AID PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. OUR MODEST AID PROJECTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND SERVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO HAVE HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS ABOUT IMPOVERISHED AFGHANISTAN AND ITS PEOPLE, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LEADERSHIP'S SOMETIMES HOSTILE STANCE. WE WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT, TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, NONE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE USG CUT OFF ALL AID TO AFGHANISTAN. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY SEEM TO FEEL IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST THAT THE USG MAINTAIN AT LEAST A MODEST AID PRESENCE HERE. THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH A PRESENCE WOULD, MOREOVER, ENABLE THE USG TO RESPOND MORE RAPIDLY TO ANY FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DOMESTIC AFGHAN

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PAGE 02 KABUL 04236 02 OF 02 021231Z

POLITICAL SCENE.

9. WITH REGARD TO THE PIPELINE, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WE HAVE 15 AFGHANS STUDYING IN THE U.S. AND 23 AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT UNDER AID-FINANCED PROGRAMS. WERE WE TN

IN DECIDING

WHETHER OVERALL U.S. INTERESTS MILITATE FOR A CONTINUATION OF A MODEST LEVEL OF AID TO AFGHANISTAN. AS BETWEEN THE PELL-STONE AND DERWINSKI AMENDMENTS, WE CLEARLY PREFER THE LATTER.

AMSTUTZ

NOTE BY OC/T: MESSAGE AS RECEIVED.

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